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Action

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Khrushchev speech March 7 at Leipzig to "All-German
Workers Conference" (published here March 27) is so unusual
that certain observations in addition to those in reftel seem
in order. Speech not only provides valuable clarification of
his thinking on German problem, but also again gives revealing
insight into his world outlook. Indeed, better understanding
obtainable from reading of full text, concerning how Khrush-
chev ticks would well repay time expended by those in West
who may have occasion to negotiate with him. Frankness of
talk may be explainable by atmosphere of "workers conference"
in which Khrushchev identified himself with audience ("we,
workers") and was obviously emotionally aroused by this.

In speech, Soviet boss reminds us again that he is
basically, and no doubt, sincerely guided by standard Marxist
cliches about inevitability of Communization of world,
including distortion of Western realities, and that he is
even deeply committed to long-promised utopian aspects of
communist future. Combined with this is abiding contempt for
West and Western institutions and philosophy, plus conviction,
evidenced by great confidence and even cockiness, that Soviet
bloc is gaining both military and political ascendancy
power terms. Only inescapable fact of present Western
military strength dictates need for policy of "peaceful
co-existence," which he calls a "fundamental issue" of our
time, unlike even German question which, though key problem
and acute, is only "partial issue."

Field of battle is therefore "economic competition"
between two blocs, in which Soviets will gain ground while
its successes undermine Western "myth" of "communist threat"

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to good life for common people, and while West undergoes economic crises. For Khrushchev, "cold war" apparently means not primarily Western moves against USSR, but entire structure of Western solidarity. His pressure to end "cold war" is thus frankly and directly aimed at causing disintegration of Western pacts and economic unions so as to encourage maximum amount of intramural Western fighting. Typically, while predicting huge increase in international economic cooperation in Soviet bloc, he denounces Western economic integration moves as schemes to extend domination of monopolies.

Aim of Berlin and German crisis which he has created is explicitly stated to be "writing down of existing situation in center of Europe" as it emerged after Second World War. By forcing recognition of status quo in Germany and Eastern Europe, and by starting moves towards military disengagement along lines of Soviet proposals on European security, Khrushchev seems to feel that he will not only bolster Soviet bloc, but also diminish "cold war" and thus hasten deterioration process in West.

As noted reftel, his approach to German unification issue "from class position" (just as capitalists did in Vietnam when they sabotaged elections promised there by 1954 Geneva accords) makes clear Soviet position that only reunification to which they will agree is extension of Communist rule to whole country. Meanwhile, Germans must have patience until they eventually get "proper" type of reunification. While waiting, they can try out Soviet scheme for "confederation." Indeed, if West German capitalists believe what they say about superior strength of their system, why are they afraid of confederation under which they could try to exercise influence in GDR to reunify Germany on capitalist basis? GDR will never be sacrificed because he can never dream of "contracting front of socialism" and because, since Lenin defined this as era of proletarian revolutions and collapse of capitalism, there can be no yielding to capitalism. West Berlin will not be harmed by becoming "free city." It can keep its capitalist system (obviously only for time being) since "evidently conditions have not yet ripened there for new order. As saying goes, each vegetable has its season."

In separate reference to how disunity of German working class has aided capitalists, Khrushchev states that Communists must show "utmost of will and patience" to class brethren who stray but who can be reasoned with to induce understanding. Capitalist world, on other hand, deserves quite different approach of being on guard and of not slipping away from class positions. This implies no cessation of Communist attempts to penetrate or otherwise establish working

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relationships with social-democrats and might even mean that all hope will not be abandoned for rewinning Yugoslavia to fold. There is also implication in Khrushchev reference to still existing (bourgeois) nationalistic grievances among some Soviet bloc citizens over certain East European frontiers, that his awareness of these divisive tendencies in his camp (in addition to others covered by class struggle theme) may be further factor impelling him to seek Western recognition of status quo.

It can be assumed from foregoing that it is now still clearer that Khrushchev is not thinking of major revision of Berlin status as primary goal by itself, even though it is of considerable importance, but has seized on Berlin as key to obtain high level negotiations and wider goals. Although striving for arrangement with West which will facilitate ~~the~~ internal consolidation and economic build-up of existing Communist empire, Khrushchev is well aware that his crisis is double-edged sword which can also operate to weaken camp of his Western enemies. His overriding immediate interest appears to be to force Western acceptance in some form of GDR, and, for this, he might well accept some contrivance for West Berlin which does not in fact greatly change political and economic conditions of that area for time being. He warns us clearly, however, that no agreements will be lasting because they can only reflect power situations which will, in turn, themselves be constantly changing in Soviet favor. The speech gives every sign that Khrushchev neither wants nor anticipates war, but this, of course, neither means that he will eschew maximum creation of tension and repeated threats of force ~~during~~ during crisis to help in achieving objectives, nor that "accidental" war is excluded.

West can no longer be under any illusion that any useful formula on reunification is attainable or that Soviets will go beyond confederation idea, even if West were to offer neutralization of reunited Germany. Essentially, proposals of West will be for public opinion, and we can undoubtedly safely go quite far in effort to prove our reasonableness. Peace treaty discussions will also degenerate into propaganda debate as long as West refuses separate treaties with two German states. Great Soviet effort will probably be made to achieve progress on its so-called European Security measures (related to disengagement) and to detach this item from question of political settlement. Both by this and by his pressure for some form of new Berlin arrangement, Khrushchev will seek to get for GDR and general status quo recognition which cannot be obtained directly through Western acceptance of confederation and peace treaty schemes.

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